('What do we do when someone with 5,000 licenses calls up and tells us they're forgotten the password to their mission critical data?')

if we encrypt the data, can we accurately unencrypt it? How do we test that?) and they also did this for what I call political reasons. For technical and support reasons, the BDE developers created backdoor passwords that would always decrypt protected tables. Now, there is another weakness in the BDE table password system. It's a balancing act, one that's different for each situation. True security is nearly impossible most security professionals talk about 'acceptable levels of risk.' You need to balance the possibility of compromise against the effort needed to secure things as completely as possible. We don't normally think about it, because locking the car does stop most thieves. But, if someone really wants your radio, they'll get it. Sure, you hope that won't happen and in many cases, it won't. It's something that's doable in many password storage systems, not just Paradox's.įor a loose analogy, consider the easiest way to break into a locked car: break the window. If you can find that number or calculate one that matches, you're in. Unfortunately, the conversion is fairly simple. That is, your password is converted to a numeric representation. Instead of storing the original password, a digest of the password is generated and then stored. The problem is not so much as flaw, but a side-effect of the way passwords are stored in the encrypted tables. Mac's correct Paradox table passwords are not secure and can be defeated with minimal effort.

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